parents involved in community schools v seattle 2007 quizlet

Parents Involved v. Seattle School District Flashcards | Quizlet A federal District Court dismissed the suit, upholding the tiebreaker. in No. in No. Parents of students denied assignment to particular schools under these plans solely because of their race brought suit, contending that allocating children to different public schools on the basis of race violated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection. 1996); see also T. Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World: An Empirical Study 141165 (2004). But what was constitutionally required of the district prior to 2000 was the elimination of the vestiges of prior segregationnot racial proportionality in its own right. Compare Brief for Appellees in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1952, No. According to PICS, in the schools in which the tiebreaker was used, there was only a two to six percent change in the racial make-up of the student body. Not even the dissenters thought the race-conscious remedial program posed a constitutional problem. Although some parents or children prefer some schools over others, school popularity has varied significantly over the years. 2 Id., at 151152; Hanawalt 3738; Seattle School Dist. Yet the school district does not explain how, in the context of its diverse student population, a blunt distinction between white and non-white furthers these goals. Does the Constitution mandate this inefficient result? Changes in the Percentage of White Students in Schools Attended by the Average Black Student by State, 19702003 (includes States with 5% or greater enrollment of black students in 1970 and 1980), % White Students in School v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 310 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). Again, data support this insight. 05908, at1617. The Washington Supreme Court ruled that the Seattle School Districts use of race was valid under the state constitution. Because of its importance, I shall repeat what this Court said about the matter in Swann. I write separately to address several of the contentions in Justice Breyers dissent (hereinafter the dissent). There is ample precedent in the decisions of this Court to uphold school segregation); Brief for Petitioners in Gebhart v. Belton, O.T. 1952, No. Properly analyzed, though, these plans do not fall within either existing category of permissible race-based remediation. See N. St. John, School Desegregation Outcomes for Children 6768 (1975) (A glance at [the data] shows that for either race positive findings are less common than negative findings); Stephan, The Effects of School Desegregation: An Evaluation 30 Years After Brown, in Advances in Applied Social Psychology 183186 (M. Saks & L. Saxe eds. His resides school was only a mile from his new home, but it had no available spaceassignments had been made in May, and the class was full. 6. of Plainfield, Union Cty., 45 N.J. 1*, How are the Equal Protection rights of public high school students affected by the jurisprudence of. Once those vestiges were eliminated, Jefferson County was on the same footing as any other school district, and its use of race must be justified on other grounds. 05915, p. 97. Under no fair reading, though, can the majority opinion in Gratz be cited as authority to sustain the racial classifications under consideration here. Instead of accommodating different good-faith visions of our country and our Constitution, todays holding upsets settled expectations, creates legal uncertainty, and threatens to produce considerable further litigation, aggravating race-related conflict. The Jefferson County Board of Education fails to meet this threshold mandate. 1 App. Second, a school cannot remedy racial imbalance in the same way that it can remedy segregation. 2d 304. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 4950 (1973) (extolling local control for the opportunity it offers for participation in the decisionmaking process that determines how . To make race matter now so that it might not matter later may entrench the very prejudices we seek to overcome. 2002). . [Footnote 11] But see Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U. S. 547, 610 (1990) (We are a Nation not of black and white alone, but one teeming with divergent communities knitted together with various traditions and carried forth, above all, by individuals) (OConnor, J., dissenting). This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its children. [Footnote 10] There are good reasons not to apply a lesser standard to these cases. 05908, at 38a39a, 45a. Although there is arguably a danger of racial imbalance in schools in Seattle and Louisville, there is no danger of resegregation. The conclusions he has set forth in Part IIIA of the Courts opinion are correct, in my view, because the compelling interests implicated in the cases before us are distinct from the interests the Court has recognized in remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination and in increasing diversity in higher education. 2001) (hereinafter Powell); Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 Ohio St. L.J. [4] However, the Court struck down both school districts' assignment plans, finding that the plans were not sufficiently "narrowly tailored", a legal term that suggests that the means or method being employed (in this case, a student assignment plan based on individualized racial classifications) is closely and narrowly tied to the ends (the stated goals of achieving diversity and/or avoiding racial isolation). I have no quarrel with the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment sought to bring former slaves into American society as full members. The plan created three new middle schools at three school buildings in the predominantly white north end. In respect to elementary schools, the plan first drew a neighborhood line around each elementary school, and it then drew a second line around groups of elementary schools (called clusters). 6704 (WD Wash., 1969), pp. For one thing, consider the effect of the pluralitys views on the parties before us and on similar school districts throughout the Nation. 2d, at 844845, nn. Id. It also contends that racial diversity is too amorphous and uncertain a concept to be considered a compelling interest, and finally disputes as inconclusive the Districts statistics regarding the increased success rates of students in integrated schools. See also, e.g., Crawford v. Board of Ed. Students are assigned to school based on the race makeup of each school, no less than 15%, no more than 50%. Roberts provides the following string citation: Parents Involved in Cmty. [Footnote 26], What was wrong in 1954 cannot be right today. See id., at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). See ante, at 3436. We granted certiorari, and now reverse. As well, because the racial tiebreaker is only used when more students apply to a certain school than there are spots, schools such as Ranier and Clevelandwhich have only ten percent of white students and are not popular choices remain racially imbalanced. Adarand, supra, at 227. Ed. Even if this purported distinction, which Justice Stevens would adopt, post, at 2, n.3 (dissenting opinion), had not been already rejected by this Court, the distinction has no relevance to these cases, in which students of all races are excluded from the schools they wish to attend based solely on the racial classifications. This discrepancy is not some simple and straightforward error that touches only upon the peripheries of the districts use of individual racial classifications. The Court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause prohibited schools from voluntarily using racial classifications to achieve integration. 3, p.8 ([W]e take the unqualified position that the Fourteenth Amendment has totally stripped the state of power to make race and color the basis for governmental action); Tr. Such deference is fundamentally at odds with our equal protection jurisprudence. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle (2007) In 2003, the Supreme Court ruled in Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger that race-based classifications, as used in affirmative-action policies, must be "narrowly tailored" to a "compelling government interest," like diversity. gation without court orders); Branton, Little Rock of Springfield v. Board of Ed., 362 Mass. . wa. Despite his argument that these cases should be evaluated under a standard of review that is not strict in the traditional sense of that word, post, at 36, Justice Breyer still purports to apply strict scrutiny to these cases. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 127 S.Ct. And it has its roots in preventing what gradually may become the de facto resegregation of Americas public schools. in No. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 27071. in No. Each of these premises is, in my respectful view, incorrect. In Jefferson County, by contrast, the district seeks black enrollment of no less than 15 or more than 50 percent, a range designed to be equally above and below Black student enrollment systemwide, McFarlandI, 330 F.Supp. . Pp. The first consists of the District Court determination in the Louisville case when it dissolved its desegregation order that there was overwhelming evidence of the Boards good faith compliance with the desegregation Decree and its underlying purposes, indeed that the Board had treated the ideal of an integrated system as much more than a legal obligationthey consider it a positive, desirable policy and an essential element of any well-rounded public school education. Hampton II, 102 F.Supp. 551 U.S. 701. See ante, at 31-32, n.16. You can explore additional available newsletters here. 1, 2, and 4 p.65 (That the Constitution is color blind is our dedicated belief); Brief for Appellants in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T. 1952, No. Strict scrutiny is not strict in theory, but fatal in fact. . See, e.g., post, at 21, 4849, 66. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 56061 (1992). Roberts cites Adarand, supra, at 227, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 132 L. Ed. All of those plans represent local efforts to bring about the kind of racially integrated education that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), long ago promisedefforts that this Court has repeatedly required, permitted, and encouraged local authorities to undertake. See Tr. See post, at 6972. See 39 Ill. 2d, at 599600, 237 N.E. 2d, at 502 (Too, the United States Supreme Court on January 15, 1968, dismissed an appeal in School Committee of Boston v. Board of Education, (Mass. See supra, at 2224. Politics 987, 991 (1976) (similar in Georgia); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39, 40, n. 1 (1971) (Clarke County, Georgia). Seattle and Louisville are two such districts, and the histories of their present plans set forth typical school integration stories. It was not long ago that people of different races drank from separate fountains, rode on separate buses, and studied in separate schools. [Footnote 7] Although Louisville once operated a segregated school system and was subject to a Federal District Courts desegregation decree, see ante, at 7; Hampton v. Jefferson Cty. Schools frequently group students by academic ability as an aid to efficient instruction, but such groupings often result in classrooms with high concentrations of one race or another. How could such a plan be lawful the day before dissolution but then become unlawful the very next day? ", Justice Stephen G. Breyer, in the principal dissenting opinion, dismissed Justice Kennedy's proposed alternatives to the labeling and sorting of individual students by race and, in a surprisingly emotional 20 minute speech from the bench, denounced the plurality opinion. The dissent half-heartedly attacks the historical underpinnings of the color-blind Constitution. At the time, the districts public school population was approximately 30% black. Id., at 690, 72 P.3d, at 167. 540, 541 (2003) (hereinafter Quillian & Campbell); Dawkins & Braddock, The Continuing Significance of Desegregation: School Racial Composition and African American Inclusion in American Society, 63 J. Negro Ed. Justice Thomas goes on to call out the dissent for adopting segregationist reasoning advanced in Brown, particularly its insistence that the Court should defer to local school board knowledge, expertise, and judgment. Today, they do not. This argument is unavailing. The Court emphasized that education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. 347 U. S., at 493. Is each to be the subject of litigation in the District Courts?); Brief for Kansas on Reargument in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T. 1953, No. in No. into account. Adarand, supra, at 228 (internal quotation marks omitted). ; see also App. They do not impose burdens unfairly upon members of one race alone but instead seek benefits for members of all races alike. The Seattle Board Statement Reaffirming Diversity Rationale speaks of the inherent educational value in [p]roviding students the opportunity to attend schools with diverse student enrollment, App. The Current Plan: Project Renaissance Modified, 1996 to 2003. All this is true enough in the contexts in which these statements were madegovernment contracting, voting districts, allocation of broadcast licenses, and electing state officersbut when it comes to using race to assign children to schools, history will be heard. And it is for them to decide, to quote the pluralitys slogan, whether the best way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race. Ante, at 4041. KORRELL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER MR. KORRELL: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. In doing so, a reviewing judge must be fully aware of the potential dangers and pitfalls that Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy mention. In his concurrence, Kennedy differed with the plurality because, he found, the goal of obtaining a diverse student body is a compelling state interest. Grutter at 33637; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 27071. Rather, it must explain to the courts and to the Nation why it would abandon guidance set forth many years before, guidance that countless others have built upon over time, and which the law has continuously embodied. Such reservations and preliminary analyses of course did not decide the merits of this questionas evidenced by the disagreement among the lower courts on this issue. When asked for a range of percentage that would be diverse, however, Seattles expert said it was important to have sufficient numbers so as to avoid students feeling any kind of specter of exceptionality. App. Other studies reach different conclusions. Petitioner Parents Involved in Community Schools (Parents Involved) is a nonprofit corporation comprising the parents of children who have been or may be denied assignment to their chosen high school in the district because of their race. Moreover, maintaining this federally mandated system of classification makes sense insofar as Seattles experience indicates that the relevant circumstances in respect to each of these different minority groups are roughly similar, e.g., in terms of residential patterns, and call for roughly similar responses. Swann did not hide its understanding of the law in a corner of an obscure opinion or in a footnote, unread but by experts. But what about Seattles? That initial 1956 plan proved ineffective. So, the argument proceeds, if race is the problem, then perhaps race is the solution. First, the histories of Louisville and Seattle reveal complex circumstances and a long tradition of conscientious efforts by local school boards to resist racial segregation in public schools. Parents Involved, the Court noted that: Seattle and Louisville had not demonstrated that they seriously considered race-neutral alternatives; the individual racial classifications used had a minimal impact that cast doubt on their necessity; the districts defined 05915, at 37 (Each [Jefferson County] school has a designated geographic attendance area, which is called the resides area of the school[, and each] such school is the resides school for those students whose parents or guardians residence address is within the schools geographic attendance area); id., at 82 (All elementary students shall be assigned to the school which serves the area in which they reside); and Brief for Respondents in No. Roberts concludes his opinion for the plurality by saying: The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race. 1, 458 U. S. 457, 472, n. 15 (1982). By 1988, many white families had left the school district, and many Asian families had moved in. The district assigns students to nonmagnet schools in one of two ways: Parents of kindergartners, first-graders, and students new to the district may submit an application indicating a first and second choice among the schools within their cluster; students who do not submit such an application are assigned within the cluster by the district. See Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d 1162, 11691170 (CA9 2005) (en banc). See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. in No. Moreover, the democratic interest has no durational limit, contrary to Grutters command. These changes conformed with the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy. See also Adarand, 515 U. S., at 261262 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (This program, then, if in part a remedy for past discrimination, is most importantly a forward-looking response to practical problems faced by minority subcontractors). The student assignment plan of Seattle Public Schools and Jefferson County Public Schools does not meet the narrowly tailored and compelling interest requirements for a race-based assignment plan because it is used only to achieve "racial balance." Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656, 666 (1993), an injury that the members of Parents Involved can validly claim on behalf of their children. Id., at 493494. In the 20002001 school year, for example, with the racial tiebreaker, the entering ninth grade class at Franklin High School had a 60% minority population; without the racial tiebreaker that same class at Franklin would have had an almost 80% minority population. . The legal showdown came in a landmark decision called Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. Id., at 38a, 103a. Because equal protection on the basis of race is at issue, the applicable standard of review to be applied in this case is strict scrutiny, as both parties agree, and as is well established in the Courts prior case law. The plurality refers to no case in support of its demand. The Court should leave them to their work. That is, it is not in all circumstances strict in theory, but fatal in fact. Id., at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U. S., at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)). See supra, at 3745. It consequently held unconstitutional the use of race-based targets to govern admission to magnet schools. The District argues that its use of race in high school admissions serves three compelling government interests: (1) the educational benefits of a diverse student body; (2) the reduction of racial isolation and de facto segregation; and (3) providing equality of opportunity to all students. Percentage of White Students in Schools Attended by the Average Black Student, 19682000. Certainly if the constitutionality of the stark use of race in these cases were as established as the dissent would have it, there would have been no need for the extensive analysis undertaken in Grutter. 10 important Supreme Court cases about education The Seattle school board itself must believe that racial mixing is not necessary to black achievement. The en banc panel came to the opposite conclusion and upheld the tiebreaker. Petitioners, an organization of Seattle parents (Parents Involved) and the mother of a Jefferson County student (Joshua), whose children were or could be assigned under the foregoing plans, filed these suits contending, inter alia, that allocating children to different public schools based solely on their race violates the Fourteenth Amendments equal protection guarantee. The District then petitioned for an en banc ruling by a panel of 11 Ninth Circuit judges. The suit alleged that they were denied entrance because they were black. Overall these efforts brought about considerable racial integration. Level=School&orgLinkId=1061&yrs=; http://reportcard. It is hard to understand how a plan that could allow these results can be viewed as being concerned with achieving enrollment that is broadly diverse, Grutter, supra, at 329. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 6 (1971); see also Monroe v. Board of Commrs of Jackson, 391 U. S. 450, 452 (1968). By 1984, after several schools had fallen out of compliance with the orders racial percentages due to shifting demographics in the community, the school board revised its desegregation plan. It predicts that todays decision threaten[s] the validity of [h]undreds of state and federal statutes and regulations. Post, at 61; see also post, at 2728. I fear the consequences of doing so for the law, for the schools, for the democratic process, and for Americas efforts to create, out of its diversity, one Nation. See App. Just as diversity in higher education was deemed compelling in Grutter, diversity in public primary and secondary schoolswhere there is even more to gainmust be, a fortiori, a compelling state interest. Before the Lawsuit, 1954 to 1972. Pp. 539 U.S. at 316. 3, p. 76 (The question is a practical one for them to solve; it is not subject to solution in the theoretical realm of abstract principles); Tr. These statements nowhere suggest that this freedom is limited to school districts where court-ordered desegregation measures are also in effect. In addition to these defects, the democratic element of the integration interest fails on the dissents own terms. (Enrollment Guide). Beyond those minimum requirements, the Court left much of the determination of how to achieve integration to the judgment of local communities. Will Louisville and all similar school districts have to return to systems like Louisvilles initial 1956 plan, which did not consider race at all? The districts have also failed to show they considered methods other than explicit racial classifications to achieve their stated goals. Justice Kennedy agreed that the Court has jurisdiction to decide these cases and that respondents student assignment plans are not narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling goal of diversity properly defined, but concluded that some parts of the plurality opinion imply an unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances when it may be taken into account. See Church of the Lukumi v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 54647 (1993); Florida Star v. B.J.F. Richmond v. J. Does it insist upon especially strong evidence supporting inclusion of multiple minority groups in an otherwise lawful government minority-assistance program?